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PS3-178        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 13-4118, 13-4411, & 13-4759 
___________ 
 
DOUGLAS THOMAS, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A026-582-649) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 2, 2014 
Before:  JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion: September 3, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 2 
 
 Douglas Thomas, a native and citizen of Haiti, petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings 
sua sponte.  For the following reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
 Thomas entered the United States on a nonimmigrant visa in 1984.  In 1988, 
Thomas was granted status as a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis 
following his marriage to a U.S. citizen.  Thomas’s conditional status was terminated 
after a failure to appear for a scheduled interview. 
 In 1991, Thomas pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine.  After his release from prison in August 1994, Thomas was served with an order 
to show cause charging him with removability.  Thomas conceded removability, but 
applied for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), waiver of removal, and 
removal of his conditional permanent resident status. 
 In 2001, an immigration judge (“IJ”) granted Thomas’s CAT application and his 
application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident.  The Government 
appealed.  The BIA sustained the appeal, vacated the IJ’s order, and ordered Thomas 
removed to Haiti.  We denied Thomas’s subsequent petition for review.  See Thomas v. 
Att’y Gen., 210 F. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential).  Thomas then filed a 
motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in Haiti.  The BIA denied that 
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motion and we denied Thomas’s subsequent petition for review.  See Thomas v. Att’y 
Gen., 308 F. App’x 587, 589 (3d Cir. 2009) (not precedential).   
 In September 2013, Thomas filed a second motion to reopen, requesting the sua 
sponte reopening of his proceedings based on the pendency of an “S” visa application, 
see INA § 101(a)(15)(S), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S).  The BIA determined that Thomas’s 
motion to reopen was untimely and numerically barred under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), 
and concluded that Thomas’s pending visa application was not an “exceptional situation” 
that warranted sua sponte reopening.  Thomas filed three petitions for review.1  The 
Government moved to dismiss the petitions for review for lack of jurisdiction. 
 Under INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we have jurisdiction to review final 
orders of removal.  We ordinarily review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 
discretion.  See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  As the 
                                              
1 Thomas filed his first petition for review on October 16, 2013, before the BIA issued its 
order denying his motion to reopen.  However, the petition for review ripened once the 
BIA entered a final order because the Government conceded that it was not prejudiced by 
the premature filing and we had not yet taken action on the merits of the petition.  See 
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 494 (3d Cir. 2012).  Thomas filed the second petition 
in this Court on November 12, 2013.  See Thomas v. Att’y Gen., No. 13-4411.  On 
November 18, 2013, Thomas filed a third petition in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, which transferred the petition to us.  See Thomas v. Att’y Gen., No. 
13-4759.  The petitions for review were consolidated for all purposes.  To the extent, if 
any, that Thomas’s third petition for review challenges the BIA’s October 4, 2013 order, 
which granted a stay of removal while the BIA considered his second motion to reopen, 
we dismiss it.  See INA § 242(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  To the extent that that 
petition challenged the BIA’s October 23, 2013 order, we will consider it with the 
proceedings initiated at Nos. 13-4118 and 13-4411. 
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Government contends, however, we lack jurisdiction to review the arguments that 
Thomas raises in this case.   
 The BIA may, at any time, exercise its discretion to reopen removal proceedings 
sua sponte.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  Sua sponte reopening is “an extraordinary remedy 
reserved for truly exceptional situations.”  Matter of G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133-34 
(BIA 1999).  Because the regulations governing sua sponte reopening “offers no standard 
governing the agency’s exercise of discretion,” we generally lack jurisdiction to review 
the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte.  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 
472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 However, we retain jurisdiction to review questions of law or constitutional 
claims.  INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Thomas has not raised a question 
of law or a constitutional claim.  Although Thomas asserts in his brief that the BIA’s 
denial of his motion to reopen violated his procedural due process rights, he does not 
adequately develop his argument and we are unable to consider it.  See Kopec v. Tate, 
361 F.3d 772, 775 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (‘“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its 
opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice 
to bring that issue before this court.”’ (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (omission in original)).  Thomas suggests that the 
denial of his application for CAT relief constituted a violation of due process, but that 
decision was not part of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen sua sponte.  We cannot 
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review it.  See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394, 405-06 (1995) (holding that judicial 
review of the BIA’s original removal order is separate from review of any subsequent 
BIA orders).  To the extent that Thomas suggests that the incompetence of his prior 
counsel constituted a denial of due process, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is not properly before us because he did not exhaust that claim before the BIA.  See INA 
§ 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion and dismiss the 
petitions for review for lack of jurisdiction.  
 
